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ABSTRACT  
Chess involves the capacity to reason iteratively about potential intentional choices of an 
opponent and therefore involves high levels of explicit theory of mind [ToM] (i.e. ability to 
infer mental states of others) alongside clear, strategic rule-based decision-making. 
Functional magnetic resonance imaging was used on 12 healthy male novice chess players to 
identify cortical regions associated with chess, ToM and empathising. The blood-oxygen-
level-dependent (BOLD) response for chess and empathising tasks was extracted from each 
ToM region. Results showed neural overlap between ToM, chess and empathising tasks in 
right-hemisphere temporo-parietal junction (TPJ) [BA40], left-hemisphere superior temporal 
gyrus [BA22] and posterior cingulate gyrus [BA23/31]. TPJ is suggested to underlie the 
capacity to reason iteratively about another’s internal state in a range of tasks. Areas activated 
by ToM and empathy included right-hemisphere orbitofrontal cortex and bilateral middle 
temporal gyrus: areas that become active when there is need to inhibit one’s own experience 
when considering the internal state of another and for visual evaluation of action rationality. 
Results support previous findings, that ToM recruits a neural network with each region sub-
serving a supporting role depending on the nature of the task itself. In contrast, a network of 
cortical regions primarily located within right- and left-hemisphere medial-frontal and 
parietal cortex, outside the internal representational network, was selectively recruited during 
the chess task. We hypothesise that in our cohort of novice chess players the strategy was to 
employ an iterative thinking pattern which in part involved mentalizing processes and 
recruited core ToM related regions. 
 
 
Keywords: Theory of Mind; Chess; Empathising; Temporo-parietal Junction; fMRI 
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INTRODUCTION 
Theory of Mind (ToM), also referred to as intentionality and mentalizing (Frith and Frith, 
1999; Völlm et al., 2006), is the ability to infer the intentions, beliefs or mental states of 
others in order to explain and predict behaviour (Powell et al., 2010, 2014; Stiller and 
Dunbar, 2007). Neuroimaging literature suggests that ToM is associated with a distributed 
network of cortical regions (reviewed by Carrington and Bailey, 2009, and Lieberman, 2007). 
Regions most commonly reported include, medial frontal gyrus [MFG: BA8/9], inferior 
frontal gyrus [IFG: BA47], ventromedial and ventrolateral prefrontal cortex (PFC) [both of 
which partially overlap orbital PFC and include BA11], temporoparietal junction [TPJ: 
BA40], superior temporal sulcus [STS: BA21] and precuneus [BA7] (see Powell et al., 2014). 
The extent to which these different regions are involved depends on the nature of the social 
cognitive task being used (Lieberman, 2007; Powell et al., 2014). A ‘core-network’ for ToM 
has been proposed, which includes medial PFC (mPFC) and bilateral TPJ (Amodio and Frith, 
2006; Frith and Frith, 2006; Mitchell, 2009; Schurz et al., 2014). These regions are 
consistently engaged whenever we reason about the mental states of others, regardless of task 
and stimuli (Schurz et al., 2014). Empathising, whilst important for inferring the emotional 
states of others and for successful social interaction (Baron-Cohen et al., 2001a; Baron-Cohen 
and Wheelwright, 2004), is different to ToM: it is the capacity to comprehend, infer, judge 
and share the emotional experiences of another (Gallese, 2003). Using functional magnetic 
resonance imaging (fMRI), Völlm et al. (2006) showed that ToM and empathy are associated 
with overlapping but distinct neural networks.  
 
Knowing how another person thinks and ‘thinks you think’ etc. is critical to predicting 
behaviour in strategic interaction games (Camerer et al., 2005). Iterated strategic thinking 
consumes working memory and requires the ability to metaphorically ‘put ourselves in 
another player’s mind’ (Camerer et al., 2005). It seems then that ToM and strategic 
interactions both require similar cognitive processes. However, while strategic interactions 
require iterative reasoning about another’s mind state from a purely strategic perspective 
(where the potential moves are predefined and based on a set of structured rules, as is the case 
during strategic interactions), ToM requires iterative reasoning about another’s mind state 
within social contexts (where rules are much less well defined, ambiguity is pervasive and 
decisions are based on prior experience and expectations which might be culturally and 
contextually embedded).  
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Studies exploring strategic interactions during gaming situations (e.g. the Prisoners Dilemma, 
Dictator and Ultimatum games) suggest that the ability to infer the mental states of one’s 
opponent is beneficial to making the best choice (Behrens et al., 2009; McCabe et al., 2001; 
Sally and Hill, 2006). The game of chess involves facets of high level cognition and problem 
solving abilities (Atherton et al., 2003) and, at least in novice chess players, the capacity to 
reason iteratively about the potential moves of the opponent. It provides a simple 
environment, using chess pieces that have a finite number of moves but through which an 
immense number of possibilities can be generated (2143, see de Groot and Gobet, 1996). 
Games like the prisoners’ dilemma and ultimatum game have a social motive or empathizing 
component which occurs during a strategic interaction (for example, altruism, fairness, 
reciprocity, and cooperation), which is not present in the game of chess. The strategies of 
novice chess players differ from those employed by expert chess players. Expert chess 
players are thought to automatically call to memory perceptual patterns of game play (known 
as ‘chunks’) when perceiving familiar positions (Chase and Simon, 1973; Gobet, 1998) and 
use them for carrying out look-ahead search (Gobet, 1997), whereas novice chess players 
proceed only using an iterative strategic thinking pattern. This would suggest that in novice 
chess players there is a large degree of neural overlap when the chess players are considering 
potential moves on a chess board and tasks that involve assigning mental states to others (i.e. 
ToM related tasks), and this is the primary aim of the present study.  
 
To explore the underlying mechanisms of social cognition, some neurocognitive studies have 
used a game theory approach (e.g. Behrens et al., 2009; King-Casas et al., 2008; Tayama et 
al., 2012). During games that involve strategic interactions, fMRI and positron emission 
tomography (PET) studies show that playing humans versus computers activates ToM areas 
(Camerer, 2009; Gallagher et al., 2002). This suggests that strategic interactions during 
games that require an iterative component are not purely based on a computational task, but 
do require some degree of social cognition such as the understanding that the other player 
holds a mind state that is different from one’s own. Few studies have looked at the neural 
correlates of chess, but those that have, show neural regions associated with chess in bilateral 
frontal lobes, parietal lobes and occipital lobes (Atherton et al., 2003; Campitelli et al., 2005). 
This study will investigate the neural network associated with ToM, using a well-established 
ToM task (Völlm et al., 2006) and identify whether a significant blood oxygenated level 
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dependent (BOLD) response for the processing of a chess task and empathising task are 
significant within those pre-defined regions identified using the ToM task.  
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METHODS AND MATERIALS 
 
Participants:  
Participants were 12 males, all right-handed, aged 20-58 years (mean age=36.42yrs, 
SD=13.91yrs). All are chess players with different levels of experience, who know the rules 
of chess and have at some point belonged to a chess club. Years playing chess ranged from 4-
48 years (mean years playing chess=26.33yrs, SD=13.75yrs). Participants learned to play 
chess between 6-17 years of age (mean age learned to play chess=10.17yrs, SD=3.22yrs). 
Intensity of play refers to the frequency of chess play. For the individual to qualify as having 
played chess with intense periods of play, they must have played regularly at a chess club for 
a period of 6 months and report playing the game at least three times a week. Participants 
were recruited from University of Liverpool and Merseyside Chess clubs. All participants 
gave signed informed consent, and the study had the approval of the local research ethics 
committee.  
 
Neuropsychological protocol:  
Participants completed an imposing memory task (IMT) used previously (Lewis et al., 2011; 
Powell et al., 2010, 2012a, 2014). The IMT provides a measure of the individuals’ ability to 
infer the mental states of others. The task involves reading 5 short stories twice, each 
approximately 200 words in length. Stories depict a social situation (e.g. an employee trying 
to decipher, from a work colleague, whether a different colleague might be interested in him). 
Following each story, the participant answers a set of 20 true/false questions containing an 
equal number of intentionality questions and factual (short-term memory) questions to 
distinguish between intentionality capacity and ability to remember factual information. 
Intentionality questions require complex mentalising about a character’s perspective within a 
social situation. The questions vary in complexity and require the individual to represent the 
mind states of others, up to and including level 6 intentionality and short-term memory. 
Further details of the IMT, including an example story and questions, as well as the equation 
for calculating intentionality and short-term memory scores, are provided in Powell et al. 
(2014).  
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fMRI activation tasks:  
Participants completed three experimental tasks in the scanner: a Theory of Mind (ToM) task, 
an empathising task and a chess task. Task stimuli were presented using ‘Presentation’ 
software (https://nbs.neuro-bs.com). All stimuli were presented in blocks. The ToM task and 
empathising task have been used previously (Brunet et al., 2000 Vollm et al., 2006). With 
these two tasks, the participant is first presented with a short comic strip consisting of three 
images. A further two images are then presented below. The participant is asked to choose 
which of the two further images complete the story emerging from the first 3 images the best. 
The chess task was designed to match as closely as possible the design of the ToM and the 
empathising tasks. The participants are presented with a strip of images of a chess board 
depicting a game in progress. A further two images are presented below this and the 
participant is asked to decide which of the two depicted moves in the further images would 
make the most sense within the sequential 4 move series. In all conditions, participants 
pressed the left key for “Image 1” and the right key for “Image 2”.  
 
Theory of Mind and Empathising task designs:  
In the ToM task, the experimental condition involved inferring the mental state of the 
character in the story. The participant is asked “What will the character do next?” In this 
condition, no social interactions of emotional situations are depicted and therefore there is 
only one character in the story. In the empathising task, the participant is asked, “What will 
make the main character feel better?” The participant must empathise with the protagonist in 
the story in order to make the correct answer. Two characters are depicted in the empathising 
condition. In the control condition the participant is presented with a story that requires only 
comprehension of the physical causalities of the protagonist in the story and must decide 
“What is most likely to happen next?” In order to match for the correct number of characters 
in the story and its complexity, the control condition for the ToM task included only one 
character while the control condition for the empathising task included two characters. Thus 
in total there were four categories of story: 1. Theory of Mind (‘ToM’); 2. Empathising 
(‘Empathy’); 3. Physical causality with one character (‘Physical 1’); and 4. Physical causality 
with two characters (‘Physical 2’). There are ten different stories per condition. Each story is 
presented twice with each block consisting of five different stories resulting in a total of four 
blocks per condition. A short question introducing the block is shown for 6s. The comic strip 
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depicting the story is shown in the upper half of the screen for 6 s and the two pictures 
showing the possible outcomes of the scenario are imposed on the bottom half of the screen 
for a further 6 s, during which the participant must respond with their correct answer.  
 
Chess task design:  
In the experimental chess task (‘chess’), the participants had to decide “What move would 
you make?” This scenario depends on the participant following the progression of a game as 
it develops and deciding which out of two options, depicting the next move, they would make 
next. The chess games were chosen at random from a database of previous chess 
masters’/grandmasters’ games (http://www.chess.com/games/) with the starting point 
randomly selected from the game. An example of the chess task and control condition is 
shown in Figure 1. Participants must choose between two images to indicate the move that 
they would make next if they were playing the game. One image is the move taken by the 
chess master/grandmaster during the chess game (correct response) and the second image 
shows a move of a different chess piece (incorrect response). In the control condition (‘ball’) 
the participant has to decide “Where will the ball land next?” The participants are instructed 
that there is only one rule in the ball scenario which is that the ball can only move from one 
side of the board to the opposite site, i.e. either left to right or top to bottom, but never, for 
example, from the top of the board to the left or right side or from the right side of the board 
to the top or bottom of the board. The ball is shown in yellow to match the yellow presented 
in the chess task condition. This scenario depends only on physical causality and requires the 
participant to follow where the ball has moved from or to. The chess pieces are also randomly 
dispersed on the board. The placement of the pieces in the middle of the squares was avoided, 
as suggested by Atherton et al. (2003), to avoid participants considering possible moves. A 
total of twelve different scenarios per condition were used. Each block consists of 3 different 
scenarios resulting in four blocks per condition. At the beginning of each block participants 
are presented with a short question introducing the block: shown for 6s. The block consists of 
two different games. The strip depicting the game or ball in progress is shown in the upper 
half of the screen for 12 s and the two pictures showing the possible outcomes of the scenario 
are imposed on the bottom half of the screen for a further 12s.  
 
(Figure 1 should go here) 
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MRI data acquisition: 
MR images were obtained using a 3 Tesla Siemens Trio (Siemens Medical, Erlangen, 
Germany) scanner with an eight-channel head coil. High resolution T1-weighted anatomical 
images were acquired sagitally using the following parameters: TE 5.57ms, TR 2040 ms, flip 
angle 8°, FOV=256, 176 slices, voxel size 1 x 1 x 1 mm3. Functional images were obtained 
using a T2-weighted gradient echo EPI sequence with the following parameters: TE=35ms; 
TR=3000ms; flip angle 90°, slice thickness 3mm, 0.3 mm gap, matrix 64 x 64, 
FOV=192mm; in-plane resolution 3 x 3 mm, 43 slices. Forty-three axial slices oriented 
parallel to the AC-PC line covering the whole brain were taken. Foam padding was used to 
prevent head movements during the scan. 
 
MRI data analysis:  
The Statistical Parametric Mapping software package (SPM8, available at Welcome 
Department of Cognitive Neurology, London, UK, http://www.fil.ion.ucl.ac.uk/spm) was 
used for realignment, normalization and smoothing and statistical analysis to create statistical 
parametric maps of significant regional BOLD response changes (Friston et al., 1995a, 
1995b). Prior to pre-processing the first two images of each experimental run were discarded. 
The image time series was first realigned to the first image (of the remaining time series). 
Sinc interpolation was used in the transformation. The T1-weighted image for each individual 
was coregistered to their mean functional image created from the realigned images. The 
structural image was segmented in native space using the VBM toolbox (VBM8) 
http://dbm.neuro.uni-jena.de/software. The resulting gray matter segment was then 
normalized to the a priori Montreal Neurological Institute (MNI) gray matter template 
supplied by SPM8. The resulting parameters were then applied to normalise the functional 
images and T1-weighted images into MNI space (Friston et al., 1995a). The resulting pixel 
size in standard stereotaxic coordinates was 2 x 2 mm, with an interplane distance of 2 mm. 
The normalized images were finally smoothed with an isotropic 6 FWHM Gaussian kernel 
prior to statistical analysis.  
 
Statistical analysis:  
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The time series was filtered with a high-pass filter of 128 s to remove subject-specific low-
frequency drifts. The experimental conditions (e.g. ‘ToM’ relative to ‘Physical 1’) were 
modelled using a boxcar function convolved with a hemodynamic response function (HRF) 
(Friston et al., 1994) in the context of the general linear model employed by SPM8. 
Specifically, blood oxygenation level dependent (BOLD) signal changes to the ‘ToM’, 
‘Empathy’ or ‘Chess’ respectively relative to ‘Physical 1’, ‘Physical 2’ or ‘Ball’ were 
modelled. This resulted in three contrast images per participant. Group results for each task 
were generated by importing individual contrast images into a second level analysis. A full-
factorial model was employed to establish the overall pattern of activation for each task. The 
variables, age, weighted chess level, intentionality score and short-term memory score were 
entered into the model as covariates.  
A ‘weighted chess level’ was given to each participant to reflect their expertise as a chess 
player. The weighted chess level is based on the intensity at which the individual has played 
chess and the number of correct responses they gave during the fMRI chess task (i.e. the 
number of times they agreed with the option chosen by a Grand Master referred to as ‘correct 
chess answers’). This was calculated using the following formula:  
                                                        
The statistical parametric maps were interpreted after applying a false discover rate (FDR) 
correction with P<0.05. Only clusters of at least k≥10 voxels were selected for inclusion in 
further analysis.  
Second level analysis revealed 12 significant clusters in which activation was significantly 
greater for the contrast ‘ToM’–‘Physical 1’ across all participants. A mask was then created 
for each of these cluster regions using the toolbox MarsBaR (http://marsbar.sourceforge.net/) 
in SPM8. Parameter estimates for all voxels within each cluster region were obtained and 
these parameter estimates were then averaged across the cluster region for the three contrasts: 
‘ToM’–‘Physical 1’; ‘Empathy’–‘Physical 2’; and ‘Chess’–‘Ball’, using the second level 
contrast image. Regions of significant association were identified using the Wake Forest 
University Pickatlas (http://fmri.wfubmc.edu/cms/software#PickAtlas; Maldjian et al., 2004) 
using Talairach coordinates of the most significant voxel (x, y, z mm).  
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RESULTS 
Descriptive statistics for the chess variables used in this study, and IMT scores can be found 
in Table 1. Weighted chess level ranged from 5 to 36 (mean = 16.4, SD = 10.5).  
 
(Table 1 should go here).  
 
Neural responses associated with the processing of ToM stimuli (contrast ‘ToM’ – ‘Physical 
1’), empathy stimuli (contrast ‘Empathy’–‘Physical 2’) and chess stimuli (contrast ‘Chess’–
‘Ball’) can be seen across the whole brain (in left and right hemispheres) in Figure 2 (panels 
A, B and C respectively). The contrast ‘ToM’ – ‘Physical 1’ yielded a total of twelve areas of 
activation, which are shown in Appendix A and Figure 3. Contrast values for comparisons 
‘ToM’–‘Physical 1’; ‘Empathy’–‘Physical 2’; and ‘Chess’–‘Ball’ were extracted across these 
twelve regions (shown in Appendix A). Areas that were significant for all three contrast 
conditions included left hemisphere superior temporal gyrus [BA22 (Figure 3, region 6)] and 
posterior cingulate gyrus [BA23/31 (Figure 3, region 5)] and right hemisphere 
temporoparietal junction [BA40 (Figure 3, region 4)]. Results showed significant activation 
for the contrast ‘ToM’–‘Physical 1’ and ‘Empathy’–‘Physical 2’ in right hemisphere medial 
frontal gyrus/orbitofrontal cortex [BA11 (Figure 3, region 3)] and bilateral medial temporal 
gyrus [BA21 (Figure 3, regions 1 and 2)]. Significant activation for the contrasts ‘ToM’–
‘Physical 1’ and ‘Chess’–‘Ball’ were found in six of the twelve regions: left hemisphere 
cuneus [BA18 (Figure 3, region 11)], fusiform gyrus [BA37 (Figure 3, region 7)], inferior 
frontal gyrus [BA45 (Figure 3, region 12)], and right hemisphere pyramis/cerebellum 
posterior lobe (Figure 3, region 8), lingual gyrus [BA18 (Figure 3, region 9)], and middle 
occipital gyrus [BA19 (Figure 3, region 10)].  
 
Areas of activation for the contrast conditions ‘Empathy’–‘Physical 2’ and ‘Chess’–‘Ball’ 
(tested across the whole brain) are shown in Appendix B. The contrast ‘Empathy’ – ‘Physical 
1’ yielded twelve areas of activation in bilateral anterior cingulate gyrus [BA24], and middle 
temporal gyrus [BA21], left hemisphere superior [BA9] and inferior [BA45] frontal gyrus, 
cingulate gyrus [BA24] and uvula/cerebellum posterior lobe, and right hemisphere precuneus 
[BA7], inferior parietal lobule [BA40], temporoparietal junction [BA40] and medial frontal 
gyrus [BA11]. The contrast ‘Chess’–‘Ball’ tested across the whole brain yielded ten areas of 
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activation in left hemisphere precuneus [BA7], caudate tail, precentral gyrus [BA6], middle 
frontal gyrus [BA6 and BA46], posterior cingulate gyrus [BA23] and culmen/cerebellum 
anterior lobe and right hemisphere temporoparietal junction [BA40], middle frontal gyrus 
[BA9] and declive/cerebellum posterior lobe.  
 
The effect of intentionality score, short-term memory score, age and weighted-chess level 
was tested for within the regions of activation generated from each of the three contrasts (i.e. 
‘ToM’–‘Physical 1’; ‘Empathy’–‘Physical 2’; and ‘Chess’–‘Ball’). No significant results 
were found following correction for multiple comparisons (FDR, P<0.05).  
 
(Figure’s 2 and 3 should go here) 
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DISCUSSION 
Findings from the present study show a distributed neural network involved in ToM, 
consistent with previous literature (Carrington and Bailey, 2009; Lieberman, 2007), which 
shows a role for superior temporal gyrus [BA22] (Völlm et al., 2006) and superior temporal 
sulcus [STS: BA21/22] (Allison et al., 2000; Enrici et al., 2011; Frith and Frith, 2003; Völlm 
et al., 2006), temporo-parietal junction [TPJ: BA40] (Enrici et al., 2011; Gallagher et al., 
2000; Gobbini et al., 2007; Völlm et al., 2006) and orbital PFC [OPFC] (Brunet et al., 2000; 
Powell et al., 2010, 2014; Spreng et al., 2009; Völlm et al., 2006) in ToM processing. The 
study also showed a role for cuneus [BA18], fusiform gyrus [BA37] and right cerebellum 
associated with the ToM task, consistent with the findings of Völlm et al. (2006).  
 
A total of twelve different areas of activation were found in relation to ToM processing, none 
of which were unique to ToM itself. When the twelve regions were used as pre-defined 
regions of interest all three tasks were associated with significant neural activation in three of 
the twelve regions: left hemisphere superior temporal gyrus [BA22] and posterior cingulate 
gyrus [BA23/31] and right hemisphere TPJ [BA40]. Previous literature supports the role of 
each of these regions in ToM (Völlm et al., 2006; for review see Lieberman, 2007), chess 
(Campitelli et al., 2005) and empathy (for review see Bernhardt and Singer, 2012) tasks. ToM 
and empathy tasks were associated with significant activation in a further three regions: right 
hemisphere medial frontal gyrus/orbitofrontal cortex [BA11] and bilateral medial temporal 
gyrus [BA21]; neural activation associated with the chess task was not found in these three 
regions. Middle and superior [BA21/22] temporal gyrus are consistently reported in ToM 
studies (Frith and Frith, 2003; Lieberman, 2007), which supports the findings in the present 
study. Middle temporal gyrus is bounded dorsally by superior temporal sulcus which sits 
ventrally to the superior temporal gyrus. Posterior superior temporal gyrus [BA22] is thought 
to be particularly sensitive to biological motion (Allison et al., 2000), which is an externally-
focused process that does not require consideration of the other’s internal mental state. Other 
research indicates a role for the superior temporal gyrus more generally in movement 
kinematics not only perception of human movement (Jastorff and Oban, 2009), which might 
explain its role in all three tasks used in the present study. In addition to its role in ToM (e.g. 
Frith and Frith, 2003; Lieberman, 2007; Völlm et al., 2006), middle temporal gyrus [BA21] 
has been shown to be sensitive to the visual evaluation of action rationality (Jastorff et al., 
2011). Jastorff et al. (2011) found that the medial temporal gyrus is sensitive to weighing up 
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predictions about external reality made from an internal working model. In their study, when 
the expected pattern of rational goal attainment was violated, there was an increase in neural 
activity within medial temporal gyrus. In this respect, it is the action kinematics of the 
characters (in the ToM and empathising task) and chess pieces (in the chess task) that recruits 
neural activation in superior temporal gyrus, but it is the rationality of the characters in the 
ToM and empathising tasks, i.e. the contextual elements in which the characters are 
constrained by, that leads to activation of middle temporal gyrus. While rationality of the 
opponent’s move during the chess task might be considered, the role of the medial temporal 
gyrus might be contingent on the relationship between goal directed biological action and its 
relevant environmental constraints.  
 
Temporo-parietal junction [TPJ; BA40: which consists of supramarginal gyrus within inferior 
parietal lobule (IPL) and a caudal portion of the superior temporal gyrus], is a key neural 
region in ToM tasks (Saxe and Wexler, 2005). While situated anatomically close to superior 
temporal sulcus, the TPJ is considered to be distinct from this region when it comes to its role 
in ToM tasks (Saxe et al., 2004). This region is thought to be particularly important for 
reasoning about the mental states of others, and is robustly reported in imaging studies that 
involve ‘false-belief’ tasks (Saxe and Kanwisher, 2003). This region is also thought to be 
important for distinguishing between self and other (Lawrence et al., 2006). The empathy 
task used in the present study involved imagining the affective state of another and comprises 
affective sharing, self-awareness and self-other distinction (Bernhardt and Singer, 2012). It is 
not, therefore, surprising that TPJ significantly activated by the ToM task, was also 
significantly associated with the empathy task. Neural activation associated with the chess 
task was also found in TPJ. One explanation for this association might be that TPJ was 
playing a similar role during the chess task, as participants reasoned about the potential 
mental states of the opponent. In all tasks, it was right hemisphere TPJ that was activated, 
which Saxe and Wexler (2005) have shown to be important in the attribution of mental states. 
Another explanation for the role of TPJ during the chess task is that this region is important 
for spatial processing skills (Fink et al., 2000; Fink et al., 2001; Marshall et al., 1997; Powell 
et al., 2012b; Richter et al., 1997), and the ability to focus attention on a particular stimuli or 
objective (Abu-Akel and Shamay-Tsoory, 2011), involved in the game of chess (Atherton et 
al., 2003; Campitelli et al., 2005).  
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ToM tasks that require considering the contents of another person’s mind (an internally-
focused process) recruit dorsal PFC (Frith and Frith, 2003; German et al., 2004) and orbital 
PFC (Powell et al., 2014). Previous research supports the role of BA11 (which resides within 
orbital PFC and partially within ventrolateral and ventromedial PFC) in both ToM tasks 
(Lewis et al., 2011) and empathising tasks (Farrow et al., 2001). Greater activity is observed 
in ventrolateral PFC and medial PFC when individuals are asked to make empathic 
judgements relative to other forms of social reasoning (Farrow et al., 2001). The role of this 
region during empathising tasks is suggested to include the ability to inhibit one’s own 
experience during the consideration of another’s state of mind (Samson et al., 2005; Vogeley 
et al., 2001). Activation of BA11 was not found in the chess task suggesting that this task 
required neither empathic judgement nor inhibition of one’s own experience when 
considering the mental state of another.  
 
ToM and chess tasks were associated with significant activation in a further six regions: left 
hemisphere cuneus [BA18], fusiform gyrus [BA37], inferior frontal gyrus [BA45], and right 
hemisphere pyramis/cerebellum posterior lobe, lingual gyrus [BA18], and middle occipital 
gyrus [BA19]. The majority of these regions i.e. BA18, BA19, BA37 and cerebellum were 
observed in the study by Völlm et al. (2006) in relation to ToM processing. A number of 
studies have also reported a role for the fusiform gyrus [BA37] in chess tasks (e.g. Bukach et 
al., 2006; Righi and Tarr, 2004). The suggestion has been that the face-selective fusiform area 
can be hijacked to process chess patterns; however, the findings regarding the role of the 
fusiform gyrus in chess processing are inconsistent (Krawczyk et al., 2011). Our findings 
suggest that the fusiform area might support internal representations at least at an early 
perceptual level. That BA18 and BA19 within the occipital lobe are involved in the ToM task 
is in line with some other literature showing a role for occipital cortex in ToM tasks (Enrici et 
al., 2011).  
 
Areas associated with chess when explored across the whole brain included, left hemisphere 
precuneus [BA7], caudate tail, precentral gyrus [BA6], middle frontal gyrus [BA6 and 
BA46], posterior cingulate gyrus [BA23] and culmen/cerebellum anterior lobe and right 
hemisphere middle frontal gyrus [BA9] and declive/cerebellum posterior lobe. This is 
consistent with previous studies that have explored the neural correlates of chess (i.e. 
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Atherton et al., 2003; Campitelli et al., 2005). Campitelli et al. (2005) also found distributed 
neural activation in BA10, BA13, BA22, BA29, BA32, BA38, BA44, BA45, and BA47, 
although it is worth noting that five of these regions had a cluster size of k<10 voxels – the 
present study considered only clusters of 10 or more voxels. Using a sample of seven novice 
male chess players Atherton et al. (2003) found activation bilaterally in BA7, BA19, BA39 
and BA40 and left hemisphere BA6, BA8, BA9 and cerebellum. Unlike the studies of 
Atherton et al. (2003) and Campitelli et al. (2005) that used a one-shot scene of a chess game, 
the task used in the present study required the participants to follow a series of shots of a 
game progressing and to decide (using a forced choice task) which out of two options they 
would make next if they were playing. This task may be considered more cognitively 
demanding than those previously used.  
 
The present study did not incorporate the three tasks into a single paradigm and therefore did 
not allow for direct comparisons in neural activation between the different tasks. To directly 
test for differences in neural activation between ToM and chess related tasks, future studies 
should consider incorporating these two different measures into the same paradigm. The 
present study used a well-established ToM task and empathising task (Brunet et al., 2000; 
Völlm et al., 2006) to activate neural areas associated with either ToM and empathising. 
Chess level, in this study was calculated by multiplying the intensity at which the individual 
has played chess since they began playing the game by their score on the fMRI chess task. 
Other scales for measuring chess are available, for example the Elo scale (Elo, 1978) which is 
an international ranking of chess expertise. However, our measure of chess expertise is based 
on the performance on the task employed in the study which is taken from a database of chess 
games played by masters and grand masters. Cumulative hours of serious study alone is 
thought to be the best predictor of a players’ current chess rating (Charness et al., 2005). The 
present study did not include hours of chess study within the calculation of chess expertise 
due to the age range of this small sample and secondly, because chess players were novice 
chess players who did not engage in serious study of the game. The fact that only novice 
chess players were used in the present study could have implications for our results, as 
neuroimaging results show that chess experts compared to novices present increased neuronal 
activation in the ventral visual system, TPJ, posterior cingulate gyrus, and orbitofrontal 
cortex (Atherton et al., 2003; Bilalić et al., 2010, 2011a,b, 2012; Krawczyk et al., 2011; 
Rennig et al., 2013). Such differences in neuronal activity could be explained by differences 
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in the strategies employed between chess novices and experts when playing the game of 
chess. Chess players automatically activate chunks (perceptual patterns that can be used as 
units of meaning) in long-term memory when perceiving familiar positions (Chase and 
Simon, 1973; Gobet, 1998). At the novice level chess strategies involve reasoning iteratively 
about the potential moves of the opponent. Future studies should therefore consider testing 
the neural overlap between ToM processing and the game of chess in a group of expert chess 
players.  
 
The acquisition of ToM has important consequences as it allows individuals to negotiate 
through a largely social word, for example, in conversations, negotiations, the development 
of social relationships, moral judgements and emotions and feeling trust (Korkmaz, 2011). 
ToM deficits are observed in individuals with a range of neurodevelopmental disorders, such 
as autism (Happé and Frith, 1996), schizophrenia (Frith, 2014), bipolar affective disorder 
(Bora et al., 2005), learning difficulty (Capps et al., 1998), attention deficit hyperactivity 
disorder (Uekermann et al., 2010) as well as Tourette’s Syndrome (Eddy et al., 2011). 
However, not all those with autism fail ToM tests. Findings from the present study may 
suggest that those with deficits in ToM processing might perform to a high level at chess 
tasks by depending on chess associated regions outside the internal representational network 
i.e. they would quickly employ a strategy of activating chunks in long-term memory when 
faced with a state of play during the game of chess.  
 
A ‘core-network’ for ToM has been proposed, which includes mPFC and bilateral TPJ 
(Amodio and Frith, 2006; Frith and Frith, 2006; Mitchell, 2009; Schurz et al., 2014). These 
regions are consistently engaged whenever we reason about the mental states of others, 
regardless of task and stimuli (Schurz et al., 2014). A large degree of overlap concerning 
areas of activation for the ToM task and the empathising task is not surprising given that the 
selected empathising task involves cognitively inferring another’s affective state rather than 
resonating with another’s affective state (Singer et al., 2004). The chess task involved 
following the game of chess and deciding which out of two moves to make next. We 
hypothesise that in our cohort of novice chess players the strategy was to employ an iterative 
thinking pattern which in part involved mentalizing processes and recruited core ToM related 
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regions. This differs to previous conceptions of chess which is wholly considered as a game 
of pure strategy.  
 
Summary 
Findings from the present study support the evidence that there is a core network which is 
recruited during ToM tasks which form the core representational areas, and were recruited 
during all three tasks in this study, with task specific areas commonly co-recruited alongside 
the core areas dependent on the nature of the internal representational task. The present study 
demonstrates that, at least in novice chess players, there is a large degree of neural overlap 
when considering potential moves on a chess board and when considering ToM scenarios. 
Future research should replicate the study using a group of expert chess players. While these 
results suggest that ToM and chess processing depend on a very similar neural network, ToM 
also depends on those regions responsible for inhibition of one’s own experience when 
considering the mental state of another and for visual evaluation of action rationality, which 
are themselves not unique to ToM itself as they are equally observed during tasks requiring 
empathy, namely frontal gyrus/orbitofrontal cortex and bilateral middle temporal gyrus. 
Chess, in contrast, depends on an extended network covering middle frontal [BA6 and 46] 
and parietal cortex [BA7]. Individuals with deficits in ToM processing, such as those with 
autism, would perform poorly at ToM tasks but might perform to a high level at chess tasks 
by depending on chess associated regions outside the internal representational network.  
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Table 1. Mean scores, standard deviations and minimum and maximum scores for age, 
weighted chess level (and the chess variables used to calculate this score), years playing 
chess, intentionality and short-term memory score (obtained from the IMT).  
 
Appendix A. Activation for contrast condition ‘ToM’–‘Physical 1’ 
Table A1. Cluster regions of activation for the contrast condition ‘ToM’–‘Physical 1’ (across 
whole brain) are shown along with their corresponding Brodmann area (BA), Talairach 
coordinates (x, y, z), cluster size (in mm3) and z-scores. Contrast values and corresponding t-
values (bracketed) for each of the twelve areas were extracted for the contrasts [‘ToM’–
‘Physical 1’], [‘Empathy’–‘Physical 2’] and [‘Chess’–‘Ball’], along with their associated P-
values corrected for multiple comparisons (significant P-values are given in bold) using the 
toolbox MarsBaR for SPM8. LH=left hemisphere, RH=right-hemisphere.  
 
Appendix B. Activation for contrast conditions ‘Empathy’–‘Physical 2’ and ‘Chess’–‘Ball’ 
Table B1. Cluster regions of activation for the contrast conditions ‘Empathy’–‘Physical 2’ 
and ‘Chess’–‘Ball’ tested across the whole brain are shown along with their corresponding 
Brodmann area (BA), Talairach coordinates (x, y, z), cluster size (in mm3) and z-scores. 
LH=left hemisphere, RH=right hemisphere.  
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Figure 1. Examples of a chess task scenario (A) and a control task scenario (B) for the fMRI 
chess task. In image (A) the chess pieces on yellow squares indicate the piece that is to be 
moved (top row - first image) or has been moved (top row - second and third images) and the 
block yellow square indicates where the piece has moved from. The participant must decide 
which move they would take next out of image 1 or image 2 (bottom row). In this example, 
image 1 is the correct response. This game is taken from the 1998 game between Jan Timman 
and Rui Damaso (http://www.chess.com/games/view?id=861309#), after move 10.Nd5. 
Image B shows the control condition; the ball can only move from one side of the chess 
board to the opposite side. Participants must decide where the ball will land next. In this 
example image 1 is the correct response.  
 
Figure 2. Areas of activation associated with the contrasts: ‘ToM’ – ‘Physical 1’ (panel A); 
‘Empathy’ – ‘Physical 2’ (panel B); and ‘Chess’ – ‘Ball’ (panel C), performed across whole 
brain. Significant regions of activation are displayed laterally on a cortical surface rendered 
brain on the left hemisphere and right hemisphere. Displayed results are significant at P<0.05 
with the false discover rate (FDR) correction for multiple comparisons. 
 
Figure 3. Twelve areas of activation yielded by the contrast ‘ToM’–‘Physical 1’ (tested 
across the whole brain) corrected for multiple comparisons (P<0.05, FDR) shown on sagittal, 
coronal and axial planes on a single subject T1 MR image supplied by SPM8. Regions were 
extracted using the toolbox MarsBaR for SPM8. Talairach coordinates (x,y,z) are given for 
the most significant voxel in each cluster. The corresponding BA region for the Talairach 
coordinates can be seen in Appendix A. The twelve different regions are numbered. LH=left 
hemisphere, RH=right hemisphere. 
 
Figure1
Click here to download high resolution image
Figure2
Click here to download high resolution image
Figure3
Click here to download high resolution image
Table 1. Mean scores, standard deviations and minimum and maximum scores for age, 
weighted chess level (and the chess variables used to calculate this score), years playing 
chess, intentionality and short-term memory score (obtained from the IMT).   
 
 
Variables Mean SD Min. Max. 
Age (in years) 36.4 13.9 20 58 
Weighted Chess level 16.4 10.5 5 36 
Years playing chess 26.3 13.8 4 48 
Intensity of chess play 2.2 1.1 1 4 
Score on fMRI chess task 7.3 1.5 5 9 
Intentionality (IMT) 4.6 0.3 4.1 4.9 
Short-term Memory (IMT) 5.0 0.2 4.7 5.4 
Table1
Appendix A. Activation for contrast condition ‘ToM’–‘Physical 1’ 
Table A1. Cluster regions of activation for the contrast condition ‘ToM’–‘Physical 1’ (across whole brain) are shown along with their 
corresponding Brodmann area (BA), Talairach coordinates (x, y, z), cluster size (in mm3) and z-scores. Contrast values and corresponding t-
values (bracketed) for each of the twelve areas were extracted for the contrasts [‘ToM’–‘Physical 1’], [‘Empathy’–‘Physical 2’] and [‘Chess’–
‘Ball’], along with their associated P-values corrected for multiple comparisons (significant P-values are given in bold) using the toolbox 
MarsBaR for SPM8. LH=left hemisphere, RH=right-hemisphere.  
Contrast = ‘ToM’–‘Physical 1’ ‘ToM’- 
‘Physical 1’ 
‘Empathy’-
‘Physical 2’ ‘Chess’-‘Ball’ 
No Talairach 
coordinates 
(x y z) 
Area of activation BA Cluster size 
z-
score 
Contrast 
value (t-
value) 
P-
Value 
Contrast 
value (t-
value) 
P-
Value 
Contrast 
value (t-
value) 
P-
Value 
1 60 -4 -11 Medial Temporal Gyrus (RH) 21 133 4.56 0.22 (4.7) <0.001 
0.22 
(4.93) <0.001 
0.11 
(0.96) 0.9 
2 -60 -16 -8 Medial Temporal Gyrus (LH) 21 25 2.85 0.1 (3.52) 0.009 
0.18 
(6.5) <0.001 
-0.05 (-
0.75) 1.0 
3 6 50 -11 Medial Frontal Gyrus/ Orbitofrontal Cortex (RH) 11 12 2.66 
0.33 
(2.4) 0.012 
0.33 
(2.86) 0.004 
0.12 
(0.44) 0.3 
4 51 -52 25 Temporoparietal Junction (RH) 40 259 4.41 
0.36 
(5.55) <0.001 
0.27 
(4.42) 0.001 
0.98 
(6.14) <0.001 
5 -6 -55 22 Posterior Cingulate Gyrus (LH) 23/31 526 3.97 
0.28 
(4.2) 0.002 
0.33 
(5.21) <0.001 
0.87 
(5.33) <0.001 
6 -69 -52 16 Superior Temporal Gyrus (LH) 22 130 3.88 
0.26 
(4.01) 0.003 
0.29 
(4.64) <0.001 
0.57 
(3.49) 0.01 
7 -30 -40 -14 Fusiform Gyrus (LH) 37 192 4.25 0.16 (4.78) <0.001 0 (0.13) 1.0 
0.41 
(4.87) <0.001 
8 15 -82 -29 Pyramis/Cerebellum Posterior Lobe (RH) - 32 3.34 
0.14 
(3.99) 0.003 
-0.07 (-
1.93) 1.0 
0.53 
(5.99) <0.001 
9 21 -97 -5 Lingual Gyrus (RH) 18 29 3.28 0.44 (3.13) 0.024 
-0.16 (-
1.17) 1.0 
1.18 
(3.39) 0.013 
Appendix A
10 42 -73 1 Middle Occipital Gyrus (RH) 19 44 3.15 0.19 (4.02) 0.003 
-0.12 (-
2.63) 1.0 
0.79 
(6.85) <0.001 
11 -24 -100 7 Cuneus (LH) 18 43 3.11 0.24 (3.52) 0.009 
-0.05 (-
0.7) 1.0 0.86 (5.1) <0.001 
12 -57 23 13 Inferior Frontal Gyrus (LH) 45 17 2.75 0.15 0.003 0.06 0.08 0.44 0.001 
 
Appendix B. Activation for contrast conditions ‘Empathy’–‘Physical 2’ and ‘Chess’–‘Ball’ 
Table B1. Cluster regions of activation for the contrast conditions ‘Empathy’–‘Physical 2’ 
and ‘Chess’–‘Ball’ tested across the whole brain are shown along with their corresponding 
Brodmann area (BA), Talairach coordinates (x, y, z), cluster size (in mm3) and z-scores. 
LH=left hemisphere, RH=right-hemisphere.  
Talairach 
coordinates 
(x y z) 
Area of activation BA Cluster size z-score 
Contrast = ‘Empathy’ – ‘Physical 2’ 
12 -52 34 Precuneus (RH) 7 1048 5.71 
57 -13 -5 Medial Temporal Gyrus (RH) 21 274 5.34 
-60 -10 -14 Medial Temporal Gyrus (LH) 21 966 5.18 
54 -52 28 Temporoparietal Junction (RH) 40 193 4.96 
-1 -19 34 Cingulate Gyrus (LH) 24 114 4.48 
-3 53 31 Superior Frontal Gyrus (LH) 9 751 4.37 
3 26 10 Anterior Cingulate Gyrus (RH) 24 94 4.08 
-54 26 1 Inferior Frontal Gyrus (LH) 45 35 3.88 
-6 17 -5 Anterior Cingulate Gyrus (LH) 24 57 3.82 
-27 -79 -26 Uvula/Cerebellum Posterior Lobe (LH) - 39 3.64 
3 50 -11 Medial Frontal Gyrus/Orbitofrontal Cortex (RH) 11 123 3.49 
48 -31 31 Inferior Parietal Lobule (RH) 40 57 3.13 
Contrast = ‘Chess’ – ‘Ball’ 
30 -61 -23 Declive/Cerebellum Posterior Lobe (RH) - 2391 6.56 
-21 -73 46 Precuneus (LH) 7 1008 6.40 
57 -52 28 Temporoparietal Junction (RH) 40 99 5.58 
-18 -31 16 Caudate (LH) Caudate tail 48 5.17 
-48 -1 37 Precentral Gyrus (LH) 6 197 5.08 
-45 26 25 Middle Frontal Gyrus (LH) 46 156 4.88 
-33 -4 55 Middle Frontal Gyrus (LH) 6 69 4.84 
-30 -55 -26 Culmen/Cerebellum Anterior Lobe (LH) - 68 4.81 
-66 -52 19 Posterior Cingulate Gyrus (LH) 23 22 4.68 
Appendix B
45 38 28 Middle Frontal Gyrus (RH) 9 69 4.58 
 
